







ABSTRACT: This study examines the tradeoffs consumers are willing
to make relative to food safety attributes and other product attributes,
such as quality and price, and develops implications for both the
government and private sector ﬁrms. Conjoint analysis was used to
elicit consumers’ preferences for fresh Red Delicious apples. The
attributes studied include price, product quality as depicted by the level
of defects, a variable representing the level of pesticide usage and the
associated cancer risk, and a variable representing different levels of
government inspection.
The results indicated that most consumers have a strong preference
for increased food safety. Government policy options that are explored
include stricter production standards, improved regulatory monitoring,
and government-deﬁned labels. Private industry options that are exam-
ined include grower labels, retailer labels, and third party labels.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of consumer preferences for food safety has proved to be somewhat of
a conundrum. Research on the subject has yielded conﬂicting results and
empirical data are scarce. The matter is further complicated because media
coverage of food safety issues tends to give consumers a highly slanted view by
focusing on relatively infrequent, but highly sensational incidents. For example,
the 1989 alar scare or the 1996 E. coli contamination of Odwalla products
received front page newspaper coverage. On the other hand, issues that have
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as major changes in food safety laws, often receive only minor media coverage.
Senauer, Asp, and Kinsey characterized consumer concern for food safety as
growing, but at most times largely latent (Senauer, Asp, and Kinsey, 1991).
Empirical research is hampered by the limited variation in food safety levels
found in most products conveniently available to consumers. For example, fresh
produce may offer consumers the greatest array of food safety options with
product alternatives that include conventionally produced produce, produce with
no detectable pesticide residues, and organic produce. However, conducting
empirical research is complicated because alternatives to conventionally produced
produce may be available only in specialty grocery stores, offered sporadically
throughout the year, or sold without labels that clearly indicate the quality
standard.
Previous research has done little to settle the debate over whether and how
much consumers are willing to pay for enhanced food safety. Most of the
consumer food safety research conducted to date has consisted of surveys
regarding consumers’ attitudes toward food safety or consumers’ intentions to buy
hypothetical products. At one end of the spectrum, several studies have found that
consumers are willing to pay very little, if anything, for increased food safety. Ott
found in a study of Georgia shoppers that one-third of the respondents were not
willing to pay any premium for pesticide residue-free produce, and that slightly
less than 10% of his sample was willing to pay as much as a 10% premium (Ott,
1990). A similar study of Pennsylvania consumers indicated that only 26% of the
sample was willing to pay a premium of more than 15% for chemical pesticide
residue-free tomatoes (Weaver, Evans, and Luloff, 1992). At the other end of the
spectrum, several studies have found that consumers have indicated a willingness
to pay substantial premiums for safer produce. In a study of North Carolina
shoppers, Eom found that 65% of respondents were willing to pay, on average,
$0.35 per pound more for produce that was screened for pesticides than for
unscreened produce (Eom, 1994). In yet another study, Van Ravenswaay and
Hoehn estimated that consumers were willing to pay an additional $0.313 per
pound to avoid Alar in fresh apples (Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 1991).
The mixed messages generated by the consumer research leave many important
questions unanswered. How much are consumers actually willing to pay for
enhanced food safety attributes? In the case of pesticides, do consumers desire a
lower level of risk from exposure to pesticides? Or would they prefer greater
assurance that established safety regulations are being followed? If increased food
safety is called for, should it be provided by a government agency or the private
sector?
The objectives of this study are two-fold. The ﬁrst objective is to develop a
clearer understanding of American consumers’ preferences for food safety and the
kind of tradeoffs they make relative to factors such as price and quality. This will
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realistic responses from consumers. The second objective is to analyze the various
alternatives that policy makers and private sector ﬁrms might consider to address
consumer food safety preferences.
RESEARCH METHOD
Conjoint analysis was used to elicit consumer preferences for food safety
attributes in a nationwide study. Conjoint analysis is a standard marketing tool
used to measure consumer preferences for product attributes as well as evaluate
potential new products (Hair, 1992). It is particularly useful in assessing consumer
preferences for nonmarket goods and in evaluating products or attributes that do
not yet exist in the marketplace. The major beneﬁt of conjoint analysis is that
consumers are given a task that is as realistic as possible, given the experimental
setting. They are asked to rate (or rank) several alternative products in much the
same fashion that they would choose between several products in any shopping
experience. Conjoint analysis is therefore ideal for circumstances where it is
necessary to realistically assess consumer preferences when such preferences
cannot be empirically observed. Conjoint analysis has been used in several food
industry studies,
1 and was used in the pilot project on which this study is based
(Baker and Crosbie, 1994).
The conjoint analysis method is designed to present respondents with choices
similar to those that they would make in a market setting. It is necessary to choose
a product and adequately deﬁne the product by selecting key product attributes
and attribute levels. In most instances researchers use a commercially available
software package to generate the experimental design (the combinations of
product attribute levels) that consumers then rate or rank. The responses are
analyzed to determine the value that individual consumers place on each attribute.
For a more detailed description of conjoint analysis see Hair (1992).
Red Delicious apples were chosen as the product, because most consumers
have a high degree of familiarity with this fruit. Four product attributes were
determined to be the most salient features, based on either their importance to
consumers or their relevance to this study. These attributes included price, quality
as indicated by the level of defects, level of pesticide usage/cancer risk, and
government oversight.
Price was chosen as a variable because of its obvious importance to consumers.
The three price levels, $0.69, $0.99, and $1.29 per pound, were chosen because
they were felt to represent a reasonable price range, consistent with the other
attribute levels and recent market conditions. During the 1994-95 production
season, the U.S. average price for Red Delicious apples ranged from $0.72 to
$0.92 (Bureau of Labor Studies, 1998).
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There are many aspects of quality, including appearance, size, color, and maturity.
While all of these aspects may be important to consumers, it would be impossible
to include all of these aspects in the model, because it would greatly increase the
complexity of the respondent’s task. For this reason, the aspect of quality that was
thought to be most highly affected by the use of pesticides, the level of defects,
was chosen as a proxy for overall quality. Three levels of quality were represented
in the model by photographs showing apples with visible defects of 0.0, 1.6, and
3.4%.
The two remaining attributes were chosen because of their relevance to the
theme of the study, food safety preference. One attribute represented the type of
pesticide policy and reﬂected different levels of pesticide usage and the level of
cancer risk associated with each pesticide policy. Conventional pesticide usage,
reduced pesticide usage, and very limited pesticide usage were described as
yielding increased lifetime cancer risks of 1 in 1,000, 1 in 10,000, and 1 in
100,000, respectively. The upper bound on the cancer risk estimate of 1 in 1,000
was based on the results of EPA studies and estimates of the National Academy
of Sciences (National Academy of Sciences, 1987).
The last variable represented the type of government program for assuring
compliance with established food safety standards. The ﬁrst level of the attribute
represented the current system whereby approximately 1% of all produce
shipments would be tested to assure compliance with existing standards. A second
level of this variable represented a certiﬁcation system whereby all produce
shipments would be inspected and certiﬁed as complying with established safety
standards before shipment to the retailer.
The attributes and attribute levels were used to develop 11 hypothetical
products. Each product was comprised of one attribute level for each of the four
attributes. For example, one hypothetical Red Delicious apple product was
described as priced at $1.29 per pound, with moderate damage, produced under a
policy of reduced pesticide use (medium cancer risk), and inspected under a
system of government monitoring. These 11 alternative products were generated
using the Bretton-Clark Conjoint Designer (Bretton-Clark, 1990). Together, these
11 hypothetical products were thought to realistically represent the range of
alternatives that consumers would face under the policy alternatives considered in
this study.
A national sample of 1,850 individuals was randomly selected by purchasing a
mailing list from a company which maintains addresses of over 90 million U.S.
households. In early 1996, each person in the sample was mailed a packet that
included a cover letter, the survey, a $1 incentive payment and a postage paid
return envelope.
The cover letter was brief and simply asked for the individual’s cooperation
and input. No information concerning the purpose of the study was provided so
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small token of the researcher’s appreciation. The survey forms included an
instruction sheet, a page describing the product attributes, and a product rating
form on which participants were asked to rate the 11 hypothetical products on a
scale of 1 to 11.
To maximize the response rate, follow-up post cards were mailed to all
non-respondents one month and two months after the initial mailing. A total of
557 responses were obtained. This resulted in a response rate of 33.2% after
accounting for those surveys which were undeliverable. After eliminating those
responses which were unusable, 510 usable responses remained.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Responses were analyzed with the SAS TRANSREG procedure (SAS Institute
Inc., 1992). For each individual, the analysis generated a series of part-worth
coefﬁcients for each variable. The part-worth scores indicate the impact of each
variable on each individual’s utility. The individual part-worth scores were
averaged across all individuals to generate an aggregate utility function. The
aggregate part-worth scores were then converted into percentages, termed relative
factor importance scores, to show the impact of each variable on the total variation
in the aggregate utility function. It is the relative factor importance scores that are
reported in this paper.
The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Figure 1. By far the most
important attribute inﬂuencing consumers’ purchase decisions was the pesticide
policy and associated cancer risk with a relative factor importance score of 61%.
The other three factors, price, level of defects, and certiﬁcation program, had
relative factor importance scores of 15, 14, and 10 percent, respectively. The
interpretation of these results is that when consumers were presented with product
choices reﬂecting price, level of defects, different levels of pesticide usage, and
certiﬁcation program, the primary factor inﬂuencing their intention to purchase
was the level of pesticide usage. Consumers in this study also clearly preferred a
real reduction in pesticide usage over a program that would provide greater
certainty of compliance with established safety standards.
The results of this study, which indicate a strong consumer preference for
increased safety margins in the use of pesticides, raise important questions such
as, who should be responsible for providing enhanced product safety? Should
consumers have alternatives regarding the level of safety in produce? Who should
pay for enhanced food safety? The discussion that follows provides a framework
for answering these and other questions.
The analysis will address how the principal participants in the food distribution
system, including producers, retailers, and government regulators might pursue
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produce pose to consumers. The analysis will also focus on how participants in the
system may address three important factors that inﬂuence the level of risk, or the
perception of that risk, to which consumers are exposed. These factors are
production standards, the level of assurance that established standards are met,
and dissemination of information regarding product safety to various participants
in the system. To avoid being unnecessarily wordy, in the remainder of this article
the term “food safety” will be used to refer to the safety of fresh produce relative
to the health risks posed by pesticides.
GOVERNMENT POLICY OPTIONS
The ﬁrst government option to be explored is the possibility of tighter government
standards. While the government could act in many ways to reduce the risk of
consumer exposure to pesticides, including directly regulating production meth-
ods, recent history would indicate that the most likely approach would be a
modiﬁcation of the existing framework. In August of 1996, years of debate over
how pesticides in the food supply should be regulated culminated in the passage
by Congress of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA). Some of the
major changes mandated by this law were:
Figure 1. Consumer Preferences for Food Safety Attributes
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raw and processed foods. Previously, pesticide residues in processed foods were
subject to more stringent regulation under the Delaney Clause than were
pesticide residues in raw products.
• Pesticide tolerances must be set at “safe” levels to provide “a reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue.” The previous law required that tolerances be established that
would “protect the public health,” and did not account for the effects of exposure
to pesticides from multiple sources.
• Special consideration must be given to the risks to infants and children in
establishing pesticide tolerances, whereas, previously such risks were not
speciﬁcally addressed.
Overall, the FQPA strengthened the safety of the food supply by imposing
more stringent standards on pesticide residues, by ensuring greater consistency in
the application of the standards, and by eliminating some exceptions allowed
under previous regulations.
Stricter Production Standards
To further strengthen the safety of the food supply the government could take
an approach similar to that used in developing the FQPA. Provisions might
accomplish this end by mandating that:
• the deﬁnition of “safe” be rewritten to provide an additional margin of safety.
• the use of carcinogens be completely prohibited.
• improved testing procedures be adopted that would ensure that the effects of
long-term exposure to pesticides be more thoroughly evaluated.
• the establishment of pesticide tolerances more thoroughly account for the
harmful effects of the interaction among various chemicals.
The major advantage of this policy alternative is that it assures uniformity and
improved food safety for all consumers. Such an action is especially appropriate
when based on scientiﬁcally-grounded, health-based criteria. However, overly
stringent standards may have several adverse impacts. They increase the cost of
produce to consumers and may actually be detrimental to consumer health. Low
income consumers, in particular, may consume less produce in response to higher
prices, and therefore be deprived of the beneﬁcial health effects attributed to fresh
fruits and vegetables. Extremely low pesticide tolerances, which are not health-
based, may also be viewed by countries that export produce to the U.S. as a means
of limiting the import of foreign produce and therefore an illegal barrier to free
trade.
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An alternative to more rigid standards is better enforcement of established food
safety regulations. Under the current system of regulatory monitoring, the FDA
samples individual lots of both domestically produced and imported produce.
Most samples collected under this program are “surveillance” samples, meaning
that there is no prior indication that the produce shipment contains an illegal
pesticide residue. “Compliance” samples are also collected to follow up on
ﬁndings of an illegal residue or when other evidence of a potential pesticide
residue violation exists. The FDA reported that it collected a total of 4,501
domestic and 5,432 import samples in 1997. Of these, 4,429 domestic samples
and 5,223 import samples were surveillance samples (Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, 1998).
The FDA analyzes produce samples using two types of tests. Multiresidue tests
can detect about one-half of the approximately 400 pesticides approved for use by
the EPA. Single residue tests or selective multiresidue tests are used to detect the
presence of one or a select few pesticides, respectively. The FDA considers many
factors including past pesticide residue data, regional intelligence on pesticide
usage, and the toxicity of various pesticides in determining the number of samples
and the methods of analysis it utilizes.
The current system of regulatory monitoring has been criticized by a host of
environmental and consumer advocate groups. The major criticisms are that:
• inadequate sampling fails to detect high rates of pesticide residue violations.
• sampling of imported produce is inadequate, because imported produce is
consistently found to have a higher rate of pesticide residue violations than
domestic produce.
• inadequate analysis of samples fails to detect many violations because most
analyses screen for only a limited number of chemicals.
• slow analysis of samples results in the failure to remove shipments found to be
in violation of established standards from the food supply.
Reform of the regulatory monitoring system should contain several key
elements:
• mandatory record keeping by growers of all chemicals used on a crop.
• use of a more targeted sampling process.
• more thorough and faster analysis of samples.
• enhanced enforcement powers for the FDA.
• stiff civil penalties for violations.
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simple reform of the system would not address the fundamental problems and
would be very costly. There are simply too many chemicals in use, the number of
shipments is too large, and the cost of analyzing for every possible chemical is too
high for a system that relies primarily on random sampling to work effectively.
The targeted system proposed above relies heavily on the use of information to
help focus the limited resources of the monitoring agency as well as a strong
deterrent to discourage would-be violators. By requiring that growers maintain
and make available to the FDA detailed records on pesticide application by crop,
the FDA could greatly increase its knowledge of pesticide usage patterns and
more effectively focus its efforts on likely problem areas. Uses of alternative
sources of intelligence, such as the analysis of sales records by pesticide
distributors could be used to detect the use of unreported chemicals. Occasional
comprehensive testing of produce shipments would also be required to ensure that
the system was in fact working effectively and to detect violators who may
attempt to circumvent the system’s controls. Such a targeted system represents a
substantial departure from current regulatory monitoring by shifting some of the
burden from the government to growers. However, this would seem to be justiﬁed,
since it is the growers’ responsibility to comply with food safety regulations and
it is in the industry’s best interest to foster greater consumer conﬁdence in the
food safety system.
Government-Deﬁned Labels
A third approach that the government could pursue is to use its regulatory
powers to determine the standards that must be met in order to use government
deﬁned labels. In this way the government could shape the options available to
private sector ﬁrms, without mandating stricter across the board standards.
Two examples serve to highlight the principal features of this option. In the ﬁrst
example, the government could establish production standards for produce grown
with no chemical pesticides. Such a policy would be similar to the organic
standards that are currently being developed. It would most likely include
provisions for labeling such produce as well as third party certiﬁcation to ensure
compliance with the standards.
A similar approach could be used to regulate reporting of pesticide residue data
to consumers. For example, the government could deﬁne a label such as “no
detectable pesticide residues,” the standards associated with usage of such a label,
and the method required to certify compliance with the label’s standards. To
encourage the use of new standards or labels by the produce industry the
government could choose to proactively pursue the above options. Alternatively,
the government may choose to pursue more of a watchdog role and act only when
industry is pursuing options it perceives as not being in the best interest of
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efforts that it perceived as misleading or adding to consumer confusion. Recent
examples of such government action include the legal deﬁnition of terms such as
“low-fat” or “lite,” and the FDA’s action to prevent food manufacturers from
using the American Heart Association’s HeartGuide seal. Because of the risk
involved in investing in the development of a standard or label that the
government might later ﬁnd unacceptable, it may be advisable for private industry
to work with the appropriate government agency to ensure that its plans will meet
with government approval.
PRIVATE INDUSTRY OPTIONS
Analysis of the options that private industry may pursue is complex because the
participants are numerous and varied. Like the government, private ﬁrms may
establish production standards, certify that established standards are met, and
disseminate product safety information. Growers, handlers, distributors and
retailers all play a role in the production and distribution of fresh produce and
have an interest in providing consumers with the assurance that the produce they
purchase is safe. Because it would be impossible to address all of the potential
ways in which private ﬁrms may respond to the demand for increased food safety,
several of the most likely scenarios are discussed below.
Grower Labels
Growers or grower groups may attempt to differentiate their product on the
basis of production standards that enhance food safety. Such standards may
include the use of no chemical pesticides, limited pesticide use, or the application
of integrated pest management techniques. An example of such a program is the
Stemilt Growers Cooperative’s Responsible Choice program. Stemilt’s is a fruit
packer serving over 200 growers in Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia.
Participating growers must document their Integrated Pest Mangement (IPM) and
Integrated Crop Management (ICM) practices. In return their fruit is labeled with
Stemilt’s “ladybug logo.”
Another example of a grower label is California Clean. Growers participating
in this program are certiﬁed by the California Clean Growers Association and
adhere to strict limits on the kinds of pesticides they use and the sustainable
farming practices they employ. With certain exceptions the use of carcinogenic
and acutely toxic pesticides is prohibited. California Clean produce is marketed
primarily in California.
Both of the above examples are representative of the relatively few grower
labels currently in use. They tend to be relatively small scale regional efforts by
growers and/or packers. This is probably indicative of the relatively high costs of
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costs include development of production standards, label development, record
keeping and certiﬁcation, gaining access to distribution channels, and consumer
promotion and education. Individual and even groups of growers may also lack
the necessary scale for cost effective branding because they grow relatively few
items and their products may be present in the market for only a few months out
of each year.
Retailer Labels
At the other end of the spectrum is retailer labels. Retailers have many inherent
advantages over growers in the establishment of produce labels. They have an
established reputation with consumers, they control the allocation of space in the
produce section, and they have a keen understanding of the consumer and
consumer purchasing behavior. Furthermore, they can work with and inﬂuence
many downstream providers to ensure that they have a broad array of produce that
meets their quality speciﬁcations throughout the year.
Wegmans, a Rochester, New York retail supermarket chain, offers one of the
few examples in the U.S. of a retail supermarket that has developed a retail label
signifying safer produce. The Wegmans IPM label is used on produce from
growers who certify that they have adhered to the IPM practices recommended by
land-grant universities in growing the crop. Wegmans relies primarily on the
farmers themselves to certify compliance with the program’s standards, although
it also has the farmers’ records inspected by an agricultural specialist.
Third Party Labels
The use of third party labels may be used to assure consumers that the food they
purchase meets some minimum safety standards. Certiﬁcation could be given to
attributes of the production method, attributes of the ﬁnal product, such as
pesticide residue levels, or both. The major advantage of using a third party to
certify compliance with food safety standards is that organizations without an
economic interest in the outcome of the certiﬁcation process may be perceived by
consumers as more credible than ﬁrms, such as growers, that have an economic
interest in the outcome. Furthermore, certiﬁcation labels provided by third party
groups may beneﬁt from the groups’established reputation and consumer good-
will.
Oakland, California-based Scientiﬁc Certiﬁcation Systems (SCS), which cer-
tiﬁes products under the NutriClean label, is an example of a third party that
certiﬁes produce meeting its standards for pesticide residues. The standard used
by SCS is “no detected residue,” using a detection limit of 0.05 parts per million
(SCS, 1998). Both growers and retailers use the SCS service. While some retailers
may use the certiﬁcation service solely as a quality assurance measure, most
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produce as having an added measure of safety.
Third party groups may also develop their own standards and labels as a means
of inﬂuencing production methods and expanding the choices available to
consumers. In this way, independent interest groups may use their organizations’
established reputation and goodwill to foster their organizational goals. Grower
groups may want to collaborate with groups that share a common interest in
promoting food safety. Partnering with a group that has established name
recognition may provide easier access to distribution channels and lower the cost
of promoting the label.
An example of an organization that has used this model is the Portland,
Oregon-based group, The Food Alliance (TFA). This independent organization
endorses farms and farm products grown under practices that protect consumers,
farm workers and the environment. Growers must meet TFA’s strict requirements
for pest and disease management, soil and water conservation, and human
resource development in order to promote their products using The Food Alliance
seal of approval. Consumer research by TFA indicated that one of the primary
reasons shoppers chose TFA-Approved produce was the third party endorsement
(The Food Alliance, 1998).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results reported in this study indicate that consumers have a strong desire for
enhanced food safety in fresh produce. Consumers, in expressing their product
preferences, indicated that they were both willing to pay for a reduction in
pesticide usage as well as accept some deterioration in produce quality. One
wonders, if this is the case, why there is such a paucity of products and labels in
the fresh produce industry that promote such attributes. Is it that consumers’
responses reﬂect their fears but not their purchase intentions? Possibly, consum-
ers’ preferences for food safety attributes are largely latent, and will only be
expressed when triggered by events such as the alar or cyclospora crises. On the
other hand, the lack of successful products addressing this consumer need may
indicate that food marketers have not yet developed the right product, that is
properly priced, adequately promoted, and conveniently available to most
consumers.
The above discussion addresses possible responses by both government and
private industry to consumers’ food safety concerns. While the proposed
government actions would address many consumers concerns, I think such action
is unlikely, particularly given that both the U.S. food safety and food labeling laws
have been recently overhauled after a period of long debate. Furthermore, since
consumer food safety concerns are complex and varied, the ﬂexibility and
462 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 1/No. 4/1998creativity of the private sector is much better suited to addressing these concerns
than the uniform, science-based approach typically taken by government. While
it is never a foregone conclusion that a product or product category will be
successful, the growing number of product labels reﬂecting enhanced food safety
attributes are indicative of a market in the early stages of development. The
fragmented nature of the market means that there is ample opportunity for
experimentation, with all of the risks and rewards inherent in new product
development.
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